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Abstract
The study examined the extent of the effect of control of corruption and political (in)stability on economic
development  in  African  countries.  The  study  employed  System  General  Method  of  Moment  (GMM)
framework on recent  pooled of  data from thirty-seven African countries  over  a period of  1996 and
2016.The study found evidence of political instability though not statistically significant and ineffective
control of corruption in African countries. The study also found that simultaneous implementation of
policies towards ensuring political stability and effective control of corruption are not complementary
and has more negative impact on development in the region. Both policies are substitute in the context of
African economy, and hence should be pursued through sequential reforms. This study also found that
continuous implementation of the current policies towards having both political stability and effective
corruption control may not have positive impact on development in Africa. The study strongly supports
sequential  policy reform in the region and also recommends review of  the ongoing policies towards
ensuring effective control of corruption in the region. 
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1. Introduction
The quest  for good welfare and economic development for over fifty years had insignificant
success in the African countries as lack of good health facilities and basic amenities, nutritional problems,
coup d’états and bad governance, social and internal insecurity, religion and ethnicity crisis, civil wars,
increase in poverty incidence, high level of unemployment, youth restiveness, increased corruption cases
and political instability still dominate the continent. The level of economic development determines the
level of corruption and extent of political instability as less developed countries tends to be more corrupt
and political unstable compared to the developed countries (Helliwell, 1994; Mauro, 1995; Montinola &
Jackman, 2002; Schumacher, 2013). There are wide spread of political instability and the problem of
underdevelopment in the African countries which are not unconnected with the high rate of corruption as
crave of politicians, political leaders and public servants illegally amass wealth in the process of using
public office for private gain. Also, Political instability and violence reduce the security of property right,
reduce capital formation, encourage capital flight and discourage foreign direct investment and capital
inflow  and  therefore  posed  significant  impediment  to  economic  development  on  African  economy.
Although a body of literature have established that corruption hurts economic development (Gyimah-
Brempong, 2002; Scheifer and Vishny, 1993) and determine political instability (Abu et al, 2014, Mauro,
2004), some researchers have argued that political instability accounted for high level of corruption found
in many countries (Campbell and Saha, 2013; Zhang et  al.,  2009). Other researchers maintained that
corruption may be desirable economically because of efficient provision of government services by by-
passing inefficient regulation through greasing the wheels hypothesis to solve the problem of unnecessary
bureaucratic delay and red tapism which constitute formidable barrier to productive investment which
lead to economic development (Meon and Sekkat, 2005). It is has been posited that frequent government
changes  reduces  development,  low development  may also  increase  the  frequencies  of  a  government
change, hence the need to deal with the problem of endogeneity (Alesina et al., 1992).
Therefore, there are possibilities of reversal causality because of dynamic relationships among
these variables of interest as one reinforces the other. An issue which is still calling for more research
work is the issue of potential endogeneity problems that could arise due to the simultaneous bias that may
arise as a result of omitted variables on both economic development and seemingly exogenous variables.
To the best of my knowledge and having considered available literature, no recent papers have adequately
taken this issue of reversal causality into consideration using Generalised Methods of Moment (GMM)
estimator.  Despite  numerous reports of  Transparency International  (TI)  that  publishes  the Corruption
Perception Index (CPI) and the Political Risk Service International Country Risk Guide (ICGR) political
risk rating which reflect the extent of political uncertainty, established that most African countries which
still  faced  with  problems of  underdevelopment  are  corrupt  and  politically  unstable.  Hence,  the  sole
objective of this paper is to investigate the nexus between the economic development, political instability
and corruption in the twenty-seven sub-Saharan African countries over the period of 1996-2016 taking
into consideration the ignored problem of simultaneity bias that may likely occur. The available statistics
showed that the continent is acutely suffering from the problem of underdevelopment, political instability
and high level of corruption yet research efforts towards this direction that incorporate potential problem
of endogeneity are in tiny proportion and this is the area of contribution to the literature.
This study is limited to Africa because of the widespread perception that African countries are
structurally different from the other countries of the world and they have the same political and economic
historical background and development. Undoubtedly, findings from this study will be of immense value
to policy analysts towards suggesting way forward to the lingering developmental problems in Africa.
2. Conceptual and Empirical Review
This section is comprised of conceptual analysis as well as summary reviewed of the recent and
relevant empirical literature. 
2.1 Conceptual Review
2.1.1 Political Instability
The concept  of  political  instability  varies  as  employed in the  numerous studies.  It  has  been
understood as the propensity of a change in the executive arm of government either by constitutional or
unconstitutional means (Alesina et al., 1992). In 1995, the study of Mauro however noted that Italy had
more than fifty changes in government between 1945 and 1995 and the country still remained relatively
stable during the period and yet Italy is one of the developed countries of the world. Could therefore, high
propensity  of  political  instability  among  African  countries  responsible  for  their  problems  of
underdevelopment among others? Another dimension is to define political instability as either a change in
the existing political  system or  a  challenge  to  it  (Mbaku,  1992).  Mbaku reinforced the argument  of
Morrison and Stevenson (1971) which defined and widen the scope of “change in the government” and
“challenges to the government”. Change in the government involved reshuffling of the cabinet, removal
and subsequent  replacement  of  the  executive or  head of  state  as  well  as  change in  political  parties’
representation after successfully election in any country while challenges to the government constitute all
factors that can pose treat to the current regime of government such as attempted or unsuccessful coups
and other forms of plot sponsored by the opposition party against the government. 
Morrison  and  Stevenson  (1971)  understood  political  instability  as  a  condition  in  political
arrangements in which institutional  structure of authority breakdown and the expected compliance to
political authority is replaced by political violence. The study further stressed that political instability
involved the understanding of differences between the power of the national elite that rule the country and
that of non-elite and as a result, there are three types of political instability: elite, communal and mass
political instability. Elite political instability is a situation in which individual or national elite who hold
leadership position in the country’s political system are forcefully removed from office usually through
coups d’etat,  attempted or unsuccessful  coups and plots.  These have been witnessed in  African post
independence and they are  usually  sponsored by military elites.  Communal  political  instability  is  an
attempt by the communal group to either form a union/coalition with another country or form their own
political  sovereignty  with  a  view of  capturing  present  government  apparatus.  This  kind  of  political
instability is manifested in civil wars, irredentism, rebellions, religion and ethnic violence. Mass political
instability on the hand involves a situation in which members of the mass group or movement which are
usually organised to pursue and maximize their well defined objectives, violently attack national elites.
The most important characteristic of membership in a mass group is that they believe in the goals and
objectives of the movement, though membership can be homogeneous with respect to class level, power,
rank and status but they do not possess a common communal trait. Until the activities of this group such
as riots, strikes, revolutions among others threaten the stability of government or national polity, they are
not regarded as part of mass political instability. It should be noted however, strike embarked upon by
labour union in the political process of demanding for improved standard of living cannot be attributed to
mass political instability.
2.1.2 Corruption
Corruption is dishonest or illegal behavior especially by government officials. It is impairment of
integrity, virtue or moral principle which involves departure from the original or from what is pure and
correct. It is an inducement to wrong by improper or unlawful means such as bribery. Corruption is said
to have manifested through fraud, embezzlement and misappropriation of public funds, sexual harassment
inflation of contracts and others. World Bank (1998) defined corruption as the “use of public office for
private  gain”  which  include  bribery  and  extortion  between  two  parties.  According  to  Nye  (1967),
corruption is that behavior which deviates from the formal duties of a public role because of private
(gains)  regarding personal,  private  clique,  close  family,  pecuniary or  state  gain or  corruption is  that
behavior which violates rule against the exercise of certain types of duties for private gains regarding
influence and such behavior  includes bribery,  nepotism and misappropriation.  Edame (2001)  defined
corruption as an anti-social  behavior conferring improper benefits  contrary to legal  and moral norms
which also undermines the authority to improve the living conditions of the people. 
Corruption is  the erosion of ethics and accountability.  Ethics is concerned with the right and
proper behavior of public officials, politicians as well as those in the private sector (Rasheed and Olowu,
1993). This is because the word “right or wrong”, “fair or unfair”, “proper or improper”, “just or unjust”
behavior constitute a society’s standard. Accountability is synonymous with being answerable and this
indicates  that  government  must  be  accountable  to  the  electorates  most  especially  in  a  democratic
societies. Therefore, in the absence of principle of accountability, corruption and other unethical behavior
will thrive as the case in the most African countries. Corruption which is global problem is a social virus
which has enveloped most African countries as its high incidence involves public servants and members
of the public who are unlawfully seeking public services.
2.1.3 Economic Development
The concept of development - and the lack of it cut across African countries - simply means
advancement  in  human  and  environmental  condition.  Economic  development  is  not  only  about  a
mathematical and statistical increment in the Gross Domestic Products (GDPs) of a particular country but
also  include  a  fundamental  progressive  improvement  in  the  standard  of  living  of  people  and  their
environment. For the pace of development in any country to fully realized its goals and objectives, it must
be sustainable. Sustainable development however, has been described as that development that meets the
present  needs  without  compromising  the  ability  to  meet  their  own  needs  of  future  generations  but
sustainable economic development is that economically sustainable system that is able to produce goods
and services on a continuing basis, to maintain manageable levels of government and external debt and to
avoid extreme sectoral imbalances which damage agriculture and industrial production (Harris, 2000).
Therefore,  the  economic  perspective  of  sustainability  from  neoclassical  economic  theory  is  the
maximization of welfare over time. The impacts of sustainable economic development will  be felt  in
African countries when the necessary governmental structures and policies that minimize corruption level
and the rate of political instability are in existence and hence the importance of this study.
2.2 Empirical Review
The  relevant  literature  on  the  political  instability,  corruption  and  economic  development  nexus  are
summarised in the Table 2.1.
3. Econometric issues and Data source
The  dynamic  behaviour  of  the  relationships  among political  instability,  corruption  level  and
economic development being studied in African economy is achieved by estimating a dynamic panel
regression model specified as follows:
 = +  +  + ........................................................(1)
Where  represents  the  regressand  for  individual  country,  i,  over  period  t;    is  the  exogenous
regressors, country specific effects is   while   is the remainder disturbance term. The theoretical
application of GMM is justified by the introduction of lagged value of regressand as part of regressors
which has led to the problem of autocorrelation. However, to overcome this econometric problem in the
dynamic  model,  a  number  of  empirical  studies  have  suggested  Arellano  and  Bond  (1991)  GMM
estimator. Arellano and Bond (1991) GMM estimator differences the model in equation 1 purposely to
get rid of the effects along with any time-invariant regressor as specified below:
 = + ) +  ......................(2)
And it is assumed that  follow first order moving average process (MA(1)).  A problem with
this estimator is that lagged levels are poor instruments for first differences if the variables are close to a
random walk and hence system GMM estimator. As a way out, system GMM developed by Arellano and
Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998) have been suggested. Arellano and Bover (1995) system
GMM proposes the use of orthogonal deviations to eliminate the potential endogeneity problem in the
dynamic panel data model instead of first  differencing suggested by Arellano and Bond (1991).  The
orthogonal deviations involves involve subtracting the average of all available future observations rather
than subtracting the previous observation. Taking orthogonal deviations removes fixed effect just like
differencing.  This  is  because  lagged  observations  of  a  variable  do  not  enter  the  formula  for  the
transformation,  assuming no serial  correlation,  they remain orthogonal  to  the  transformed errors  and
available as instruments. This procedure enabled the same lags of variables to be valid as instruments
under the two transformations. On the other hand, in addition to lagged levels of variables as instruments
for equations in first differences, Blundell and Bond (1998) System GMM brought to bear additional
instruments to increase efficiency.
        = +  +  +  ; i = 1,......, n; t = 1,......,T..............................(3)
Where  is a vector of predetermined and endogenous covariates which may include the lag of   all
of which may be correlated with the . An estimable model for the study is therefore specified as 
 =  +  +  +  + 
Where   is  constant,  …………  are slope coefficients,   are  control  variables:  human capital
proxies such secondary school enrolment rate and access to medical  care,  trade openness,  population
while other variables remained as described in table 2. Expressing the equation in a doubled-log format
yield:
 =  +  +  +  +  + …(Model 1)
3.2 Data and sources
This study is based on dynamic panel data model covering the period of 1996 to 2016 on 37 African
countries which made up for 740 total number of observations. Table 4.1 below shows the variables
employed for the estimation of the analysis and its corresponding sources. The regressand is the real GDP
per capital and the regressors are control of corruption, political instability index. From the specification
above, the a priori theoretical expectation is that   is expected to be positive and statistically significant
in relation to economic development process and if otherwise, it implies that the control of corruption is
ineffective in the region. Political  stability has been measured government stability,  internal  conflict,
external conflict and ethnic tensions in the region. Likewise  is expected to be positive and statistically
significant in relation to economic development and will be an indication that there is political stability in
the  region  and  its  impact  is  positive  on  economic  development.  If  otherwise,  there  exists  political
instability which is detrimental to the development process in African countries. The equation 1 and 2
above, test the validity of the sole objective of this study as the coefficients,   and  as well as their
signs determine the magnitudes and the direction of relationship or effect of both the control of corruption
and political (in)stability on the economic development in the African countries.
The study of Rajan and Zingales (2003) have argued the issue of simultaneous reforms agenda. This is a
situation where two policies are simultaneously pursued to measure its impacts on the regressand. This
paper also examined the effectiveness of simultaneous policy reform efforts in the African countries by
interacting the two governance measures and adopt  cross partial  derivative to measure its  impact  on
economic development. Expectation from the analysis is for the coefficient of interactive term,  , to
either have positive or negative sign. In the case of positive value, this is an indication that the two
policies are complementary and can be simultaneously implemented and if it is negative, this indicates
that the two policies variable are substitute and as a result the reform efforts need to be sequential in line
with Mckinnon (1991) gradual and sequential order. Also, the coefficient  is expected to be statistically
significant which suggest policy effectiveness and if otherwise, it indicates policy ineffectiveness within
the region.
 =  +  +  +  *  +  +  + 
……………………….….(Model 2)
Further examination of the effect of the simultaneous policy reforms of the two indicators was carried out
by introducing partial derivatives of the growth rate with respect to each of the two governance indicator
and this will only be carried out where the coefficient   is significant. This study introduced  partial
derivatives of development with respect to each of the governance of the indicator to assess the short-run
effect of control of corruption and political (in)stability. This is with a view of testing the marginal effect
of governance indicators on the economic development in African countries.
 =  
 =  
Continuous implementation of both good governance indicator is theoretically expected to have strong
impact on the development process of the African countries however, this is not automatic as many of the
countries still suffering from the problem of underdevelopment despite their long time efforts in fighting
against  corruption and perpetration of  criminal  and other  violence activities  despite  establishment  of
various institutions. This study is of the view that alternative approach to corruption and other governance
problems may be particularly useful to low income countries and interestingly all the countries are from
the same region. Thus, the study tries to test this hypothesis rather than imposing it and the intuition is,
does the region benefits from current approach to corruption and other political problems?
 =  +  +  +  +   +  + 
+ …………………………..(Model 3)
The partial derivative of the regressand with respect to each of the governance variable is:
 =  
 = 
4. Discussion of Empirical Result
The sources and definition of each variable employed in this study are provided in Table II.  The
sample period and summary statistics which provide information about the mean and standard deviation
and the countries for which these variables available are contained in Table III. The correlation matrix
between the explanatory variables is also provided in Table IV. All tables are revealed in the appendix.
From Table  III  as  shown in the  appendix,  for  the  period of  study,  there  exist  ineffective control  of
corruption and political instability as this reveals an average of the -0.42 and -0.27 respectively in the
region.  This suggests that  at  an average the region is  still  suffering from governance crisis  which is
characterized by weak structure and this has its impacts on the growth and development in the region.
Table  IV displayed the correlation matrix.  The correlation matrix  shows the correlation between the
independent  variables  which  should  be  low  degree  or  moderate  degree  to  suggest  the  absence  of
multicolinearity  between  independent  variables.  As  suggested  by  Bryman  and  Cramer  (1997),  the
correlation between each pair of independent variable should not exceed 0.8; otherwise, the variables may
be suspected of exhibiting multicolinearity. Multicolinearity is usually regarded as a problem because it
means those regression coefficients may be unstable. The result of this matrix showed that all possible
combinations of the explanatory variables had correlation coefficients, whether negative or positive, were
very low, weak and even less than 0.9. If the correlation coefficient between two variables is one, the
variables are perfect substitute for each other and the two cannot be included in a particular model for
analysis. 
MODEL I
This model is contained in the Table V. The model reveals that the fight against corruption is not
effective in the region as the control of corruption negatively correlated with economic development. It
suggests that one unit change in control of corruption would lead to -0.0209 unit change in the rate of
economic  development  in  these  countries.  The  coefficient  of  control  of  corruption  is  negative  and
statistically  insignificant  at  all  convectional  levels.  This  is  contrary  to  the  a  priori  expectation  as
numerous studies have established negative effect of corruption of on the economic activities in these
countries (Anoruo and Braha, 2005; Okafor et al. 2014). It is expected that the various measure put in
place to control corruption should have had positive impact on the growth and development in these
countries. The negative magnitude of impact of corruption control showed the degree of impotency of
anti-corruption policies in African countries. This model also reveals that, there exists political instability
in the region though not statistically significant. It suggests that one unit change in the political stability
index would lead to -0.0106 unit change in the rate of economic development in these countries. This is in
line with the a priori expectation as numerous studies have reported that there is lack of political stability
in  the  African  countries  (Mbaku,  1988;  Fosu  2002;  Aisen  and  Veiga  2013).  The  lagged  dependent
variable has an estimated coefficient of 0.76, with standard error of 0.02; this indicates a strong evidence
of considerable persistence in the variable. It however indicates slow speed of adjustment to shock and
this is in consonance with the findings of Baltagi et al. (2007). 
MODEL II
This model is summarised in the Table V and it is the model with interactive terms. The estimate
of the interaction term is negative and statistically significant at all convectional levels. This indicates that
efforts  towards  improving  the  quality  of  both  variables,  control  of  corruption  and political  stability,
simultaneously could have more negative impacts on the economic development in the African countries.
This is contrary to the a priori expectation. This also indicates that the two measures are substitute and
that simultaneous implementation of both policies would be at detriment to the economies of the African
countries. Hence, this study advocated for sequential policy reform in relation to process of ensuring an
effective control of corruption and political stability in the African countries.
MODEL III
Table V also displayed model  Model  III.  This  model  is  a quadratic specification of the  two
governance indicators. The two measures are negative and statistically insignificant at all convectional
levels. This may suggest that continuous implementation of both policies may impact negatively on the
economic development in the region. It may also indicate that the developmental effect cannot be reaped
with continuous or consistent application of current policy in relation to control of corruption and efforts
put in place to have stable governance in African countries.
5. Conclusion and Policy Recommendation
The debate on the corruption, political instability and development nexus is still ongoing. The
destabilizing effect of political instability is relatively settled in the empirical literature but the effect of
corruption on development have remained polarized. This is because some studies have maintained that
corruption stifles development and others have contended that in some circumstances, corruption may be
economically desirable simply because it provides a solution to inefficient regulation, bureaucratic delay
and bottlenecks which may lead to ineffectiveness in governance. This study investigates empirically the
relationship between corruption, political instability and development in the African countries in a System
Generalized  Methods  of  Moment  (GMM).  The  study  found  existence  of  political  instability  and
ineffective control of corruption in the region. The study also found that simultaneous implementation of
policies of ensuring political stability and effective control of corruption are not complementary and has
more negative impact on development in the region. The implication of this is that both policies are
substitute, and hence should be pursued through sequential reforms. Findings from the study also reveals
that continuous implementation of the current policies towards having both political stability and effective
corruption control may not have positive impact on development within the continent.
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